INTRODUCTION
The proposed title of the publication, "Law beyond boundaries", induces by its subject matter scope looking at law in a broad aspect of its validity, which-as can be assumed-should be "detached" from different 2015 INTERNATIONAL LAW 769 legislations of individual states 1 . And although "the awareness that law applies to a particular territory was formed a long time ago" 2 and is dominated by thinking about law through the prism of national borders 3 , it is safe to say that, national law is not the only legal system functioning in the normative sphere.
Today, this sphere-apart from the international dimension signaled above, being realized within the borders of individual states-also has an external dimension, the emanation of which is public international law. Constituting a particular superstructure over individual states, it arises as a result of their law-making activity. Therefore, it does not cause controversy that in the simplest terms, it is a legal system governing relations between the actors of this law. Taking into account the so-called "plural legislators" 4 concept, it cannot stay unnoticed that, states share the competence of an international legislator with international organizations, having no legislative monopoly in this regard.
In light of the foregoing, juxtaposing the international-law legal order with the title of the publication, one can indicate beyond doubt that, the scope of application of public international law is not determined by state borders. In this perspective, it is a law "beyond boundaries" and, therefore, such that not having a solely territorial (state) scope of application specific 1 The presented text was published in the conference proceedings of the Second International Conference on Interdisciplinary Legal Studies 2015-Law Beyond Boundaries, Toronto, Canada, 2015. 2 J. NOWACKI & Z. TOBOR, WSTĘP DO PRAWOZNAWSTWA 161 (Kraków : 2000) . The authors indicate that, the term "territory" is of Roman origin. Territorium in Rome was a geographical sphere in which public authority was exercised. Ibidem, at 161. 3 A precise definition of the term "national border" was expressed on the basis of Polish doctrine of the subject by W. Staszewski. In this perspective, national borders define an area over which its territorial sovereignty extends and are usually defined as surfaces perpendicular to the surface of the earth, separating the territory of one state from the territory of other states or from areas not subject to territorial sovereignty (e.g., the high seas). National borders also divide the underground and the airspace. A slightly different approach can also be found in T. Jasudowicz, according to whom the term "national border" is understood as a line on the earth's surface within which the territory of a state is contained and which separates it from the territory of another neighboring state or from an area not subject to the sovereignty of any state, namely the high seas. , universal character. It manifests itself not only in the fact that norms of public international law bind (by establishing a rule) all countries forming the international community, but also in the fact that, they bind the international community as a whole. General international law can be defined-invoking the words of R. Kwiecień-"as the law of and for the entire international community" 6 . While the "spatial sphere of application of domestic law is, in principle, the territory of a given state, including its sea-going vessels and aircraft, international law operates in a space defined as a community, and sometimes international community" 7 .
The above considerations presenting the status of public international law as a law beyond boundaries and a system at the same time do not, however, preclude the existence of some divisions within it. They are related to the process of fragmentation which results in the separation of certain subsystems from this law. By this, division of international law into said subsystems, also known as sections or regimes (which will, for instance, include international environmental law or international law of human rights, etc.) is done. This, in turn, requires posing the question 8 of whether the process of fragmentation threatens the unity of the international legal order. And whether the reverse process, referred to as constitutionalisation of this law, may be a specific remedy for this, which at the present stage of development of the international community is rather a certain postulate.
An attempt to answer the above questions was adopted as the main purpose of this study, which will seek to resolve the essential-from the point of view of analyses carried out-question of whether international law is a law of divisions or a law beyond boundaries?
I. DIVISION (FRAGMENTATION) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Research on the fragmentation of international law 9 -so as to fully reflect its essence-entitles to understanding it as a process which produces (and under the influence of which are developed) individual sections of international law. These are derived from general international law, according to the criterion of the subject of a regulation, thereby focusing on a specific topic. In practice, "the use of the criterion of the subject of a regulation means that, groups of normative acts and groups of customary law norms are singled out according to the regulated circle of social relations" 10 . This perception of the process of fragmentation constitutes a dynamic approach to this issue. Fragmentation within it is a process that lasts and certainly will continue to do so, inscribing itself in the development of the international legal order.
The dynamic approach in question can be distinguished, a contrario, from a static approach. In it, fragmentation will be identified with the state (factual and legal) of often a transient nature, which was created as a result of the development of international law. Thus, the already progressive fragmentation of this law has contributed to it. Its assessment will be made each time at a particular stage of this development.
This indicates that, as a result of the process of fragmentation of international law, recognized globally as a system of law, certain subsystems are being singled out, to which the doctrine assigns different names (from "specialist systems" 11 , to "functionally defined issue-areas" 12 , to sub-systems 13 and meta-systems 14 , to, finally, regimes 15 ). Therefore, as noted by J. Menkes, the natural cause and foundation of 772 US-CHINA LAW REVIEW Vol. 12: 768 fragmentation is the discussed division into quasi-branches within the international law itself 16 . This accurate observation, expressed by the cited author, allows the perception of fragmentation of international law through its internal division happening as part of this normative order. This result in such sections, possible to be singled out today, as: international human rights law, international environmental law, international criminal law, international economic law, international investment law, international labor law, or even international sports law. The status of these sections is variedranging from those that have a well-established normative base, to those which are in statu nascendii. Their catalogue is not exhaustive, of course. Nor does it constitute depreciation of the classic "core" of international law in the form of international law of treaties, international humanitarian law, or international diplomatic and consular law. However, the development of contemporary international relations and in a way the need for specialized law results in the expansion of the material scope of international law, which is impossible not to notice.
For the sake of complementing and certain correctness of the argument, one needs to further note that the proposed way of understanding the concept of "fragmentation of international law" is not the only one on doctrinal grounds. The subject literature devoted to this subject, and, which is to some extent a derivative of reports of the International Law Commission a different approach to the topic, but above all the different understanding of the notion of "fragmentation of international law", which affects the way this phenomenon is interpreted.
Even a brief analysis of the position of the doctrine shows that, the discussed conceptual category is not presented uniformly. In addition to the above, it is also reduced to the specialization of international law 18 , (or functional specialization 19 ), diversification of international-law legal order 20 (or, simply, its diversity 21 ), as well as a conflict of legal norms 22 . However, explicit opting for the understanding the concept of "fragmentation" as a division on-going in the international law (which is the closest to the author of this study), allows leaving the cited categories outside the scope of this discussion. It seems all the more reasonable that often-establishing a conceptual relationship between them and the concept of "fragmentation"-the effect is taken as the cause and no notice of feedback between these concepts results in them being defined erroneously. For example, is it legitimate to identify fragmentation with the diversification of international law? Is it not the case perhaps that fragmentation-understood as a division-contributes to greater diversification of international law and this differentiation is also one of the reasons (causes) of fragmentation? Responding positively to a question posed in this way will rule out the possibility of semantic equation of both concepts.
In the context of the on-going process of fragmentation of international 774 US-CHINA LAW REVIEW Vol. 12: 768 law, it is impossible not to look at international law as a whole. Will the development of this process not threaten the unity of the international legal order? In order to be able to resolve this issue, it seems necessary to look at international law through the prism of constitutionalisation there of.
II. UNITY (CONSTITUTIONALISATION) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Fragmentation of international law, like its division, is often contrasted with its constitutionalisation 23 , serving to ensure the unity of internationallaw order, arousing probably no less controversy (than the former). They primarily involve the fact that the idea (concept) of international constitutionalism is closely related with the term "constitution" 24 . The latter, in turn, being associated more often with the constitutional law of individual states (rather than international law), as a rule, remains restricted to acts of fundamental importance for states.
This does not mean, however, that international law does not use this term. The various international organizations functioning under statute attribute it the nature of their constitution. They do this by default, intuitively, referring this term to the instrument of incorporation, or sometimes explicitly, as exemplified by the Constitution of the International Labour Organization 25 .
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Naturally, on the basis of academic debates, there is no shortage of arguments for assigning a constitutional status of the international community to the United Nations Charter of June 26, 1945 26 (hereinafter referred to as the UN Charter), and although due to its ubiquitous nature and the rule expressed by the provisions of art. 103 of the UN Charter it is not devoid of legitimacy, one can find in the doctrine dissenting views indicating that, the Charter is not a constitutional source of the original entire international law in accordance with the ideal of the constitution as the Grundnorm of a legal system, nor is the entire international law subject to law-making control of the United Nations
27
. Especially the last argument is quite essential.
In the face of discrepancies regarding the status of the Charter, it seems reasonable to continue to explore the meaning of "constitutionalisation". It was pointed out by J. Zajadło who argued that, the discussions accompanying it are not so much about "constitution in a formal meaning", but rather about a complex of phenomena evidencing certain constitutional processes in the international community 28 . This is highlighted by the rather obvious distinction between such a reception of constitution (as an act of fundamental importance for the entire international community) and constitutionalisation understood as a phenomenon that allows for greater "conflictual unity" 29 of international law. Thus, according to R. Deplano, the idea of constitutionalism is (…) an autonomous concept of international law 30 , which allows for detachment of the discussed conceptual category from constitutional law and "inscribing" in contemporary international law.
Against the background of the above the first aspect of the issue in question emerges, in which constitutionalisation is a certain process, placed in general international law. At the current stage of its development, "it is necessary to base this law on a more formalized basis 31 ". Therefore, constitutionalisation will mean-as noted by W. Czapliński-"the development of certain standards of an ordering character, defining the 26 relationship between its individual elements and the power structure (including legislative powers). The unity of the system would be based on a hierarchy of norms with the leading significance of the UN Charter" 32 . The importance of this observation does not need to be emphasized. Speaking of progressive fragmentation of international law which results in the creation (singing out) of new sections of this law, particular attention must be directed to defining (determining) rules on the relationship between international law and its individual parts, or in other words, between the general law and the specialist law (if we assume by simplification that, this character is borne by sections of international law generated as a result of fragmentation).
Thus, understood constitutionalisation rejects the need for the adoption of constitution in the formal sense. Going further, it also rejects, the use of constitutional concepts as a means for interpreting international law in general, and restoring coherence and unity within international law in particular"
33
. It does not, however, exempt from the need to develop rules to ensure the functioning of the various parts in a whole, so as to eliminate the potential for conflict situations. Of course, this must be done within the framework of international law understood systemically-so as to defend the thesis that it is one, though not uniform, legal order.
This observation corresponds to the second aspect of the analyzed issue, in which the process of constitutionalisation is positioned in the various sections of international law, not in the law as a whole. This in turn makes it necessary to refer to two important issues.
Firstly, despite the fact that at the level of general international law, the legitimacy of analyzing the concept of "constitutionalisation" through the prism of constitution in the formal sense was rejected, this kind of constitution, in a certain simplification, can be found in the sections of international law that have arisen in connection with the legislative activity of international organizations. In order to describe this state of affairs, one can invoke the doctrinal term of "mini-constitutionalisation of individual legal regimes," 34 where adopted statutes under which international organizations operate are assumed to be constitutions. The statutes are "generally semi-autonomous structures within the broader international 32 Ibidem, at 597. 33 R. Deplano, op. cit., at 68. 34 The term adopted after: T. Widłak, O Konstytucjonalizacji prawa międzynarodowego-ku konstytucji społeczności międzynarodowej? VIII PROBLEMY WSPÓŁCZESNEGO PRAWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO, EUROPEJSKIEGO I PORÓWNAWCZEGO 68 (A. D. MMX ed.).
